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Abstract
In a market with informationally connected traders, the dynamics of volume, price informa-
tiveness, price volatility, and liquidity are severely aﬀected by the information linkages every
trader experiences with his peers. We show that in the presence of information linkages among
traders, volume and price informativeness increase. Moreover, we find that information link-
ages improve or damage market depth, and lower or boost the traders’ profits, according to
whether these linkages convey positively or negatively correlated signals. Finally, our model
predicts patterns of trade correlation consistent with those identified in the empirical litera-
ture: trades generated by “neighbor” traders are positively correlated and trades generated
by “distant” traders are negatively correlated.
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One pervasive feature in nancial markets is the existence of information linkages among
market participants. Traders and investors are socially connected and have access to comparable
sources of information. Many writers describe the nancial community as one of overlapping
groups of people who share similar opinions, either because they are endowed with comparable
signals about the fundamentals and/or communicate regularly with one another [e.g., Shiller
(1984, 2005), Shiller and Pound (1989), Hertz (1998)], or simply because they are exposed to
similar cultural biases [e.g., Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006)]. Many information-based ex-
planations of asset price movements hinge upon the assumption that investors do not experience
information linkages at all. In this paper, we relax this assumption and explore the resulting
implications along several dimensions: market eciency, liquidity, trading volume, correlation
among trades and volumes generated by heterogenous traders, and gains from informed trading.
Our notion of information linkages is closely related to the recent empirical literature on
the value of local information, social interactions and information networks in nancial markets.
For example, portfolio decisions are known to be related to social networks, be they cultural
or linguistic [Kelly and O'Grada (2000), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Cohen, Frazzini and
Malloy (2007)]. Locality eects matter as well. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) provide strong
evidence that geographical proximity inuences managers' portfolio choices. Hong, Kubik and
Stein (2005) document that US fund managers located in the same city commit to correlated
investment decisions. The authors argue that such correlated choices arise either through peer-to-
peer communication or because fund managers in a given area base their decisions upon common
sources of information - such as a local newspaper or TV station. Similarly, Feng and Seasholes
(2004) nd that in the Chinese stock market, trades are positively correlated for geographically
close investors, but negatively correlated for distant investors.
A rational explanation of these ndings must necessarily rely on a pronounced heterogeneity
in the investors' information endowments. Thus, at the heart of our analysis is the idea that in
asset markets, there are groups of traders whose signals and beliefs are more correlated with some
and less correlated with other groups of traders. A natural measure of informational distance
between any two traders is the amount of information they share. To generate heterogeneity in
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informational distance, we consider a model with strategic traders who are locally connected to
common sources of information about the long term value of an asset. We call these local con-
nections \information linkages." Accordingly, we dene close traders as those who are connected
through these linkages, and distant traders as those who are not. Local connections give rise
to overlapping networks of traders, which may include only one's closest neighbors or the entire
market. Indeed, there are no obvious arguments suggesting whether information connections
should be best thought of as local or global. Our framework is kept as general as possible to
account for a wide spectrum of possibilities.
Our model builds on the seminal papers of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster and
Viswanathan (1996) and Back, Cao and Willard (2000), who develop multi-trader generalizations
of the Kyle's (1985) model. The point of departure is the introduction of information linkages
among traders. Our main goal is to uncover patterns of trade correlations among traders. In
equilibrium, every trader makes use of the information available at the linkages he has with
his local peers. He also knows, however, that by trading aggressively, he reveals part of this
information to distant peers. What is the ultimate eect on the correlation between \close" and
\distant" trades?
The central prediction of our multiperiod model is that in a market where strategic traders
have access to information linkages, the correlation among trades is heterogeneous, both tempo-
rally and spatially. More in detail, the correlation among trades is very high at the beginning
of the trading period. The same correlation decreases over time, and exhibits dierent patterns,
depending upon the informational distance among traders:
 For traders who are suciently close (close neighbors), the correlation among opinions and
trades decreases over the trading period, although it remains persistently high.
 Traders' opinions and trades diverge with the informational distance. Eventually, the corre-
lation between trades is negative for relatively distant traders. A signicant and persistent
divergence in trades occurs even when the number of information linkages is large enough
to make any two traders' opinions quite similar at the beginning of the trading period.
The economic interpretation for the positive correlation between close trades is intuitive: the
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linkages among traders raise the correlation of the information endowments and, hence, the trade
correlation. This property, although intuitive, is in sharp contrast with well-known features of
markets without information linkages, where the correlation among trades eventually becomes
negative [see Foster and Viswanathan (1996)]. At the same time, our model also matches the
empirical evidence on the negative correlation between distant trades documented in the literature
[see our previous discussion of Feng and Seasholes (2004) and the papers we mention below].
The economic mechanism at work in the model is the following. Over time, and as in Foster
and Viswanathan (1996), the equilibrium asset price conveys more and more information about
the traders' average opinion of the asset value, not the single private opinions every trader has
about this value. Therefore, over time, traders stand on opposite sides of the market, on average,
which makes the correlation between trades decrease. In our model, this correlation tends to
become negative, especially for distant traders. However, the presence of information linkages
in the market \kicks in" for close traders. In particular, we nd that for close traders, the
information eects induced by the linkages dominate the negative correlation arising from the
tendency of each trader to stay on the opposite side of the market. Therefore, the cross sectional
properties of correlated trading we unveil in this paper originate from the combined eects of
both the information linkages and the market maker's learning process.
Although these properties are consistent with the available empirical evidence, there remains a
number of empirical issues called for by our model. Importantly, the current empirical literature
on correlated trading relies on the unconditional correlation among trades in a given period
[as in Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) or, more recently, Feng and Seasholes (2004),
Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005), Bae, Yamada and Ito (2006), Barber, Odean and Zhu (2006),
and Dorn, Huberman and Sengmueller (2008)]. Our theoretical analysis suggests that a more
interesting concept is that of trade correlation occurring prior to a corporate event such as
an earnings announcement. The model implications on this correlation are quite strong. For
example, they can be used to test whether correlated trading in nancial markets is induced by an
alternative and, perhaps, more standard mechanism, based on herding behavior. Herding would
indeed lead to a positive correlation among trades initiated by close traders. However, herding-
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based explanations for correlated trading rely on agents' sequential moves [e.g., Bikhchandani
and Sharma (2001)], and should be consistent with a trade correlation that increases prior to
a corporate earnings event. As noted, our information linkages mechanism predicts just the
opposite: correlation of trades for close traders is high and positive, but it decreases over the
trading period.
Our model also predicts that information linkages among traders have implications on tra-
ditional market variables such as volume, liquidity, and eciency, as well as on the gains from
informed trading. Linkages do aect all these variables. As we shall show, even a small number
of information linkages among traders can induce a quite large eect on the equilibrium price
and trading activity. The predictions of our model can be streamlined as follows:
 Compared to a market without information linkages, a market with information linkages is
characterized by higher volume, eciency, and in general, higher liquidity.
 Information linkages boost the expected gains from informed trading if they convey nega-
tively correlated signals. However, if the signals available at the information linkages are
positively correlated, the mere existence of these linkages damages the traders' prots.
The economic interpretation for the rst property is as follows. Consider the prediction about
volume. Heterogeneity in private information is a source of monopolistic power for traders. But
information linkages destroy part of this monopolistic power. Consequently, every trader trades
aggressively in order to preempt his peers, which makes market-wide volume increase. (The
model predictions about eciency and liquidity can be understood in a similar vein.)
The model implications on the gains from informed trading can be explained as follows. In
our model, information linkages aect the traders' prots through two channels. On the one
hand, information linkages damage the traders' monopolistic power. On the other hand, the
very same linkages improve the quality of the traders' inference about the fundamental value of
the asset. If the signals available at the information linkages are positively correlated, the losses
generated by the rst eect are larger than the gains stemming from the second eect. This
property holds under a wide range of conditions on the initial traders' beliefs and the market
structure, as summarized by the number of traders and batch auctions, as well as the initial
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correlation of the signals made available at the traders' locations and the number of information
linkages. These results, however, are reversed if the signals available at the information linkages
are negatively correlated.
Although Section 3 further qualies these ndings, the model implications about volume
and liquidity are in general quite clear: stocks traded in markets with many informationally
connected traders are those with large volume and liquidity. To date, the available empirical
literature provides only indirect support to these predictions. For example, Dorn, Huberman and
Sengmueller (2008) show that correlated trading tends to be greater in heavily traded stocks, a
property our model generates through the information linkages channel. Similarly, Hong, Lim
and Stein (2000) supply evidence that stocks with lower analyst coverage are those for which rm-
specic information ows more slowly to the market; Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) nd
that stocks with higher analyst coverage are those with lower adverse selection costs of trading.
While analyst coverage might proxy for the information linkages in the market, there exist
alternative measures of information connectedness devised in the more recent literature, which
purposedly capture locality and network eects [see, e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2001), Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005), or the empirical networks methods sur-
veyed in Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2008)]. These measures are well suited to investigate how
trading volume and liquidity can possibly relate to the presence of information linkages among
traders. Similarly, the empirical literature lacks a systematic analysis of the impact information
linkages have on trading prots. One exception is Hau (2001), who provides evidence that local
interactions between traders and nancial intermediaries might adversely aect trading prots.
Our theoretical work sheds new light on this nding. At the same time, it calls for further in-
vestigations in which such preliminary evidence about information linkages and traders' prots
could be expanded and related to the other testable implications of our model discussed so far.
The remainder of the article is as follows. In the next section, we develop the information
structure of the model. In Section 2, we derive the equilibrium while in Section 3, we discuss in
detail the testable implications of the model. Section 4 contains a succinct discussion of related
work. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains technical details omitted in the main text.
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1 Information structure
1.1 The asset market and traders' location
We consider a market for one risky asset in which trading takes place in N  1 batch auctions.
The asset pays a random payo f  N(0; 2f ) at the end of the trading period. The crucial
feature of the model is that a number of imperfectly competitive traders experience information
linkages related to the asset payo. Precisely, we assume that the traders are physically located
around a circle. By convention, they are ordered clockwise, such that trader i has trader i+1 as
his clockwise neighbor and trader i   1 as his counterclockwise neighbor (see Figure 1). There
are M such traders and, for reasons developed below, we assume M is an odd number.
Signals about the fundamental value f are available at each trader's location. Let s0 =
[s1;0;    ; si;0]> be the M  1 vector of the signals in the market. We assume that each signal si;0
is available at the i-th trader's location and is observed by some of the i-th trader's neighbors,
on both sides. Hence, we allow for \double-sided" information linkages. Precisely, we assume
that the signal available at any trader's location is observed by G clockwise neighbors and G
counterclockwise neighbors of any given trader, and we take G to be exogenous in the model. The
i-th trader's information set is, then, si;0 = [si G;0;    ; si;0;    ; si+G;0]>, G 2 [0; (M   1) =2].1
For example, for G = 1, the signal available at the i-th trader location is also observed by traders
i 1 and i+1, as in Figure 1. In this case, traders i 1, i and i+1 observe si;0; trader i observes
si 1;0, si;0 and si+1;0, and so forth.
To ease notation, we let G^ = 2G+1 be the number of signals every trader has access to. Let
si;0 denote the average signal available to the i-th trader,
si;0 = G^
 1
GX
k= G
si+k;0: (1)
In the absence of information linkages, we have that G^ = 1 and, hence, si;0 = si;0 = si;0 for all
1In the language of the networks literature, our information structure is a regular ring lattice with M vertices
(the traders), with each of the vertices being connected to 2G neighbors through undirected edges: see, for example,
the seminal work by Watts and Strogatz (1998).
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i. In principle, the maximum number of information linkages is G^   1 = M   1, in which case
si;0 = s0 for all i. However, this market may fail to have a linear equilibrium as the number of
auctions N gets large and the uncertainty related to liquidity trades (to be introduced later) gets
small, as initially conjectured by Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and shown by Back, Cao
and Willard (2000). Therefore, we shall limit ourselves to analyze cases in which G^ < M .
Our information structure can be interpreted in a variety of ways. For example, every signal
si;0 can be thought of as being broadcast to the i-th trader's location through a local newspaper
or TV station, as suggested in the empirical work of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005) and Ivkovic
and Weisbenner (2005), who argue that locality eects are likely to be related to information
linkages among investors. In our model, informationally linked traders are those who have access
to some common information source. In the limiting case in which G^ = 1, every trader gathers
information from a unique local news source, and there are no information linkages among them.
As G^ increases, these sources of news overlap across traders, and the number of information
linkages every trader experiences with his peers, 2G, is interpreted as the media coverage of
information providers.
The information network we consider can also be interpreted as one in which each trader
observes the average signal of his neighbors with some error. To illustrate, consider again Figure
1. In this example, the i-th trader observes, among other things, si+1;0 + i;0, where si+1;0 =
1
3 (si;0 + si+1;0 + si+2;0) is the average signal available to the (i+ 1)-th trader, and the error term
is i;0 =  13si+2;0. This interpretation is important: as we shall show, each trader's strategy is
linear in his average signal, in equilibrium. Therefore, the information structure in this market
is such that in equilibrium, each trader observes the trade of his neighbors with some error.
Another interpretation of our information structure is that of social proximity among traders.
Social connections can relate to geographical, cultural, demographic or linguistic distance, and
translate into dierences in beliefs among traders. For example, in an early contribution, Shiller
and Pound (1989) argue that the presence of social networks might explain portfolio decisions
among US investors. More recently, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) nd that language, culture
and geographical distance aect portfolio choice in the Finnish stock market; Cohen, Frazzini and
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Malloy (2007) document that education networks aect the trading behavior of portfolio managers
connected to senior ocers of publicly traded companies. In general, repeated interactions among
traders can lead them to sharing close opinions and views. At the other extreme, socially distant
traders are less likely to interact and, hence, more likely to have relatively more independent
opinions and views. Then, our model can be understood as one that focuses on the asset pricing
implications of a given architecture of opinion formation. Stein (2007) lays down the foundations
for an honest exchange of ideas to arise among strategic players. This exchange stems from
complementarities in the production of ideas. For example, to come up with a useful idea about
an asset payo, it may be necessary to have access to the peers previous ideas on the same topic.
In our model, information linkages can be thought of as the result of such fruitful conversations
among close traders.
1.2 The distribution of signals
Next, we describe the distribution of the signals available at the traders' location. We follow
Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and assume that all the signals are jointly normally distributed
with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix equal to 	0 = E([s1;0;    ; sM;0]> [s1;0;    ; sM;0]).
The unconditional distribution of the signals is symmetric in that it is invariant to a permutation
of the indices 1;    ;M . The joint distribution of the vector [f s0]> is given by:
24 f
s0
35  N
0@24 0
0
35 ;
24 2f c01>
c01 	0
351A ; 	0 =
26666664
0 
0    
0
0 
0
. . .
...
0
37777775 ; (2)
where we assume that 	0 is invertible, which it is, provided 0 >   (M   1)
0, a restriction we
maintain throughout the paper. Such restriction ensures that the average of the average signals,
s =M 1
PM
i=1 si;0, is a sucient statistic for the full information liquidation value,
E (f j s0) = s; (3)
where  = c0M (0 + (M   1)
0) 1.
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The average signal every trader has access to, si;0, plays a key role for each trader forecasting
problem and, hence, for the trading strategies, as we shall show below. We now derive the
distribution of the average signals (si;0)
M
i=1, under the assumptions made so far.
We denote the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of the average signals with 	0 =
E([s1;0;    ; sM;0]> [s1;0;    ; sM;0]). The elements of this matrix depend on the number of infor-
mation linkages in the market. Accordingly, we set 	0 = 	0 (G), where
	0 (G) =
26666664
0 (G) 
0 (1; G)    
0
 
M 1
2 ; G
    
0 ( 1; G)
0 (G) 
0 ( 2; G)
. . .
...
0 (G)
37777775 ; (4)
and
0 (G) = var (si;0)

0 (k;G) = cov (si+k;0; si;0) ; k = 1;2;    ;M 12
denote the unconditional variance of the average signals available to any trader (0 (G)), and
the unconditional covariance between the average signals of any two traders who are located k
positions apart (
0 (k;G)) (k 6= 0). We have that 
0 (k;G) = 
0 ( k;G), which follows by both
the circular information structure and the double-sided nature of the information linkages in this
market. Furthermore, 0 (G) is the same for each trader and given by
0 (G) =
0 + 2G
0
G^
: (5)
due to the symmetric unconditional distribution of the signals in Eq. (2).
Consider, next, any two traders i and j = i+ k with k 6= 0, and the unconditional covariance
between the average signals these two traders have access to, i.e. the o-diagonal element 
0 (k;G)
in Eq. (4). The covariance between the average signals depends on: (i) k, the distance between
the i-th trader and the (i+ k)-th trader; and (ii) the number of information linkages in the
market, G. This dependence on k arises because the number of signals every trader shares
with the other peers depends on their relative position on the circle. For example, assume that
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2G < (M   1)/ 2. In this case, trader i shares 2G signals with trader i+ 1, 2G  1 signals with
trader i + 2 and in general 2G + 1   k signals with trader i + k. Eventually, trader i shares no
signals with trader i+ 2G+ 1 and beyond.
To derive explicitly the covariance between any two traders' information endowments, we
need to distinguish between two situations that may alternatively arise, depending on information
linkages being \large" or \small." Intuitively, if the number of information linkages, 2G, is larger
than the number of traders each trader has on either side, (M   1)/ 2, some pieces of information
might \go through" over and above the dimension of the information network any trader belongs
to. Then, we need to analyze the following two cases.
(i) Small number of information linkages: 2G  (M   1)/ 2. In this case, any two traders can
not observe common signals, provided they are located suciently apart, as in Figure 2.
However, if two traders are suciently close, they have access to some common information.
In Appendix A, we show that,
For 2G  M 12 , 
0 (k;G) =
8><>:
0 (G)  G^ 2 (0   
0) k; for k 2 [1; 2G+ 1]

0; for k 2

2G+ 1; M 12
 (6)
(ii) Large number of information linkages: 2G  (M   1)/ 2. In this case, information linkages
are such that any two traders might have access to common sources of information even
when each of them does not observe the signals available at the location of the other, a
property we label \double overlap." Consider, for example, Figure 2. In this example,
trader i has access to the signal available at the location of trader i `, although he can not
observe the signal available at the location of trader i+k1. However, traders i+k1 and i `
are informationally connected, as their relative distance is less than G. Therefore, traders
i and i + k1 do observe some common signal (at least the signal si `;0), even if they are
not connected to the same information linkage. In Appendix A, we show that the \double
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overlap" modies the correlation structure in (6) as follows:
For 2G  M 12 , 
0 (k;G) =
8<:
0 (G)  G^ 2 (0   
0) k; for k 2

1; 2
 
M 1
2  G

20 (G)  G^ 2M (0   
0)  
0; for k 2

2
 
M 1
2  G

; M 12

(7)
To summarize, the variance-covariance matrix of the average signals available to all traders,
	0 (G) in Eq. (4), depends on the number of information linkages, which makes 	0 (G) not
invariant to a permutation of the indices i = 1;    ;M , unlike 	0 in Eq. (2). By Eq. (5),
the elements on the main diagonal, 0 (G), are the same. The o-diagonal elements, instead,
are decreasing in the traders' relative distance k, according to the pattern in Eqs. (6)-(7).
Thus, the correlation between the average signals of any two traders located k positions apart,
0 (k;G) = 0 (G)


0 (k;G), varies with their relative distance.
Despite its asymmetry, the matrix 	0 (G) preserves a useful property of symmetric matrices.
Dene the unconditional covariance between the average signal available to any trader i, si;0,
with the sum of the remaining traders' average signals,
 0 (G) = cov
P
k 6=i sk;0; si;0

=
X
k 6=i

0 (k;G) :
Due to the information structure in this market,  0 (G) is the same for each trader. In Appendix
A, we prove that,
 0 (G) = (M   1)
0 + 2G
G^
(0   
0) ; for all G 2

0; M 12

: (8)
The fact that both 0 (G) and  0 (G) do not depend on location implies that each trader's
forecasts of (i) the asset value and (ii) the sum of all remaining traders' average signals, are
independent of k, as we shall show below.
2 Equilibrium price and trades
This section develops a dynamic model that relies on the information structure described in the
previous section. We derive the equilibrium price and traders' strategies (Proposition 1) following
12
the methods set forth in Foster and Viswanathan (1996), in which the equilibrium outcome arises
out of a set of possibly o-equilibrium strategies and prices. Then, we provide a characterization
of the trading strategies (in Proposition 2), which we shall use to understand the correlation of
trades and volumes we uncover in Section 3.
2.1 Equilibrium characterization
Let (xi;n)
N
n=1 be the sequence of orders submitted by the i-th trader over the trading period.
Trades are chosen so as to maximize the expected prots, viz
Wi;n  max (xi;t)Nt=nE
hPN
t=n (f   pt)xi;t
Fi;ni ; n = 1;    ; N; (9)
where Fi;n is the trader i information set at the n-th batch auction. On top of these informed
orders, there is a sequence of liquidity trades (un)
N
n=1, where un is independent and identically
distributed as a standard normal variable, with mean zero and variance 2u. Thus, the aggregate
order ow is given by:
yn =
MX
i=1
xi;n + un; n = 1;    ; N: (10)
The (M +1)-th market participant is the market maker, who commits himself to oset the order
ow according to the Semi-Strong eciency rule:
pn = E (f jFn) ; n = 1;    ; N: (11)
where Fn = f(yt)nt=1g denotes the market maker's information set at the n-th batch auction.
Upon observing the aggregate order ow, the market maker updates his estimate of the average
signal available to any trader i as
tn = E (si;0jFn) = G^ 1
GX
k= G
E (si+k;0jFn) = E (si;0jFn) ; (12)
which is independent of the i-th trader's specic location since the variance-covariance matrix
	0 in Eq. (2) is symmetric.
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We focus on equilibria in which both traders' strategies and the pricing function are linear with
respect to the information structure, that is, (i) each trader strategy is linear in his informational
advantage relative to the market maker,
xi;n = G^n (si;0   tn 1) ; (13)
and (ii) the market maker's learning about the asset value satises,
pn = pn 1 + nyn; (14)
for some deterministic sequences n and n to be determined in equilibrium. We shall come back
later to the economic interpretation of the linear strategy xi;n in Eq. (13) (see Proposition 2).
Foster and Viswanathan (1996), Back, Cao and Willard (2000) and Bernhardt and Miao
(2004) restrict attention to the same equilibrium conditions summarized by Eqs. (13) and (14).
Moreover, Foster and Viswanathan (1996) explicitly prove that any trader i can manipulate the
remaining traders' beliefs about the asset value only through the aggregate order ow. The
existence of information linkages does not destroy this property, as we show in Appendix B (see
Lemma 3). Consequently, the residual order ow, (yi;t   xi;t)n 1t=1 , constitutes a redundant piece
of information in the information set of the i-th trader at the n-th batch auction, and we set
Fi;n = fsi;0; (yt)n 1t=1 g. It follows that (si;0   tn 1) is sucient for any trader i to (i) forecast
the asset value and (ii) forecast (the sum of) the other traders' informational advantage, before
submitting his order at time n, i.e.
E (f   pn 1jFi;n) =

 
 n 1 (G) + n 1 (G)

M n 1 (G)
(si;0   tn 1) ; (15)
and
E
P
j 6=i (sj;0   tn)
Fi;n =  n 1 (G)n 1 (G) (si;0   tn 1) : (16)
where n 1 (G) (resp.  n 1 (G)) is the variance of the residual informational advantage (resp.
covariance between
P
k 6=i(sk;0   tn 1) and (si;0   tn 1)) conditional on Fn 1. Note that the
regression coecients in Eqs. (15)-(16) are identical for all traders, despite the asymmetry in
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the variance-covariance matrix of average signals. As a consequence, the trading intensity in Eq.
(13) does not depend on each trader's location. This property keeps our model markedly distinct
from the two traders \simultaneous information acquisition" model considered by Bernhardt and
Miao (2004), in which signals have dierent variances (see their Section 3.2 and Proposition 5). A
further dierence between our analysis and that in Bernhardt and Miao (2004) is that in nding
the equilibrium, we take into account o equilibrium paths. To this end, we follow the approach
in Foster and Viswanathan (1996), and conjecture that the price induced by past suboptimal
play shows up both in trader i strategy and in his value function. The necessary and sucient
conditions for an equilibrium hinge upon the mutual consistency between these two conjectures:
Proposition 1. There exists a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which trading strategies and
prices are as in Eqs. (13)-(14).
The complete equilibrium characterization is detailed in Appendix B. Note that in our model,
not only are traders concerned with forecasting the information the remaining traders possess.
This learning process is also complicated by the existence of heterogeneous distances among the
traders, and the number of information linkages every trader has with his neighbors. Indeed,
trading strategies and prices are sensibly aected by the heterogeneous correlation structure
arising from the information linkages among traders, as we shall explain in detail in Section 3.
2.2 Value estimates and subjective mispricings
Back, Cao and Willard (2000) show that in continuous time, the equilibrium trading strategies
and the expectation of the sum of others' trades are linear in the subjective mispricing perceived
by any trader i, i.e. E (f jFi;n)   pn 1. This property survives in our model with information
linkages, since traders adopt identical strategies. Our model displays the additional features that
the forecast of individual trades is linear in the subjective mispricing, and that it does depend
upon the traders' distance. We now produce the formal argument, which we shall use to develop
the interpretation of the model predictions in the next section.
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We denote with n the ratio of the market maker's residual variance of the average signal
in the market, var ( sjF;n), to the residual variance of each trader's average signal, var ( si;0jFn),
viz
n =
var ( sjFn)
var ( si;0jFn) : (17)
Furthermore, let 2f;n and &
2
f;n denote respectively the market maker and trader i residual variance
of the full information asset value after n rounds of trading
2f;n = var [E (f j s0)jFn] (18)
&2f;n = var [E (f j s0)jFi;n+1] : (19)
The equilibrium trading strategies in Eq. (13) can then be expressed as in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. Any trader i strategy in Eq. (13) is linear in the subjective mispricing E (f jFi;n) 
pn 1, i.e.
xi;n =
G^n
n 1
[E (f jFi;n)  pn 1] ; (20)
and
n =
2f;n   &2f;n
2f;n
: (21)
Moreover,
E
P
j 6=i xj;n
Fi;n = (Mn 1   1)xi;n; (22)
and
E (xi+k;njFi;n) = n 1 (k;G)xi;n
= E
P
j 6=i xj;n
Fi;n| {z }
 Market side direction
 
P
`=2fi;i+kg n 1 (`;G)

xi;n| {z }
 Information linkages direction
; (23)
where, for a given G, n (k;G) is the correlation, at the n batch, between the average signals
available to any two traders who are located k positions apart.
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Proposition 2 generalizes, in a discrete time setting, Lemma 6, and other results, in Back, Cao
and Willard (2000). As in Back, Cao and Willard, Eq. (20) indicates that any trader buys/sells
the asset if he believes the asset is undervalued/overvalued. Moreover, Eq. (21) reveals that n
is a measure of the relative \tightness of beliefs" between the market maker and the traders, i.e.
the percentage of the market maker's residual uncertainty that is accounted for by each trader's
information.
Eqs. (20) and (22) imply that any trader expects to trade in the same direction of his peers
and, thus, to be on the same side of the market if and only if the market maker's residual
uncertainty is suciently large, i.e. n > M
 1. This property generates a \rat race." When
n < M
 1, each trader expects to be on the opposite side of the market, which generates a
\waiting game." The next section demonstrates that in our model, the dynamic properties of
the \tightness of beliefs," n, are severely aected by the number of information linkages every
trader has with his peers, 2G.
Finally, Eq. (23) highlights the role information linkages and traders' distance play in our
model. Consider, rst, a market without information linkages, i.e. G = 0. In this case, trader
i information set collapses to the signal available at his location and, hence, n (k; 0) = 
n/n,
which is obviously independent of k. By Eq. (23), then, the i-th trader expects any other trader
to submit the same order, i.e. E (xi+k;njFi;n) = E (xi+j;njFi;n), for all k; j, which implies that,
E (xi+k;njFi;n) =
E
P
j 6=i xj;n
Fi;n
M   1 ; for all k 6= 0:
Therefore the i-th trader believes to be on the same side of the market whenever n > M
 1,
and to be so with respect to every single trader.
In contrast, Eq. (23) reveals that in the presence of information linkages, any trader i can
expect to simultaneously trade in the same direction of the market but against some of his peers.
Indeed, Eq. (23) implies that when G > 0, the i-th trader's expects dierent orders from dierent
traders, i.e. E (xi+k;njFi;n) 6= E (xi+j;njFi;n), for all k; j, jjj 6= jkj.
As we explained in Section 1.2, the correlation between the traders' information endowments
decreases with their relative distance [see Eqs. (6)-(7)], which means that each trader agrees
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more with his neighbors and less with his distant peers. Therefore, if the i-th trader is on the
same side of the market and, for example, believes the asset is undervalued, he has to trade in the
same direction of his close neighbors, although he might trade against peers who are suciently
far apart. In Eq. (23), the term labeled \Market side direction" captures the rst eect (trading
with the peers), and the term labeled \Information linkages direction" captures the second eect
(trading against the peers). In practice, whether two traders are on the same side of the market
depends on their relative distance and the number of information linkages, as we shall show in
the next section.
3 Predictions
This section analyzes the properties of the equilibrium predicted by the model. In Section 3.1,
we set a benchmark, based on real market data, which we use to calibrate the model parameters;
in Section 3.2, we look at the model predictions about correlated trading and volume among
traders; in Section 3.3, we analyze how information linkages aect the dynamics of volume,
liquidity, market eciency and prots arising from informed trading.
3.1 The empirical benchmark and model calibration
We identify earnings announcements as natural proxies for the end of the trading period in our
theoretical model. Accordingly, we retrieve report dates of quarterly corporate earnings for all
AMEX and NYSE stocks during the scal year 2006, using the COMPUSTAT database. Our
initial sample comprises 10077 report dates for 2723 stocks. We look at the behavior of volume
and price impacts during two trading weeks before the announcement, as in other empirical
investigations of this sort [e.g., Chae (2005)]. This choice implies a value of N = 10 trading days,
which is the trading period we shall use to produce the model predictions in Sections 3.2 and
3.3. Data on prices and trading volumes for the eleven days n days prior to announcements are
obtained from the CRSP database. They restrict our initial COMPUSTAT sample to 9088 report
dates for 2611 stocks, once we exclude data with zero volume in at least one trading period.
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Let the observed prices and volumes prior to announcement j be denoted as pnj and vnj ,
for n = 1;    ; 10. We measure the ten price impacts occurring prior to each announcement j
as the ratios of the absolute price change divided by trading volume, nj = jpnj j =vnj . We
rely on a two-way sorting procedure to gure out the volume and price impact patterns for a
typical announcement in our sample. For each announcement j, we compute the average volume,
vj = 10
 1P10
n=1 vnj , and the average price impact,
j = 10
 1P10
n=1 nj , occurring over the
trading period. Then, we select the announcements preceded by (i) average volumes vj within
the 14.645-th and 85.355-th percentiles, and (ii) average price impacts j within the very same
previous percentiles. This sorting delivers precisely the middle 50% range of our initial universe
of rms, along both volume and price impact dimensions.
To appraise the behavior of volume and price impacts for a typical stock in our sample, we
take cross sectional averages relating to all rms surviving our two-way sort, and normalize them
to their value in the rst trading round. The second and third columns of Table 1 (labeled
\volume" and \lambda") report these statistics for each trading day, along with cross sectional
standard errors. Volume and price impacts display a clear pattern: volume increases slowly over
the trading period and peaks up in the last trading round; price impacts, instead, decrease over
the trading period, overall.
We further dissect our initial COMPUSTAT sample by the average dollar volume occurring
prior to each announcement j, pvj = 10
 1P10
n=1 (pnjvnj). First, we split the sample into three
sorts: large, medium and small rms, which correspond to average dollar volumes pvj above the
80-th percentile, between the 40-th and 60-th percentiles, and below the 20-th percentile. For
each of these sub-samples, we apply the two-way sorting procedure described earlier, exclude data
with zero volume in at least one trading period, and retrieve the volume and price impacts for
a typical large, medium and small rm in our sample. We end up with three sub-samples that
include 921 large rms, 913 medium rms, and 693 small rms.
Columns 4 through 9 in Table 1 report summary statistics for the average normalized volume
and price impacts, along with cross sectional standard errors, on each of the three sub-samples.
Volume is U-shaped and increases towards the end of the trading period, in all sub-samples.
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Furthermore, price impacts decrease with the trading round in each sub-sample, on average,
especially at the level of small and large rms.
Our ndings are similar to previous results obtained with US data: for example, Krinsky and
Lee (1996) report that at a high frequency level, volume increases prior to earnings announce-
ments; more recently, Chae (2005) uncovers a pattern for volume quite similar to ours, using daily
data. As for the price impacts, it is well-known that adverse selection costs widen just around an
earnings announcement. Our data display a similar feature. For example, at the announcement
date, the cross sectional average price impact for large rms is 1.0604, with a standard error of
0.0259. In the remainder, however, we do not include observations for the announcement date,
as we wish to make the trading period end exactly before the announcements, in the spirit of
the model. Figure 3 displays the average volume and price impacts for large rms, along with
cross sectional 95% condence bands. We use data related to these rms to calibrate two model
parameters: the variance of the asset value, 2f , and the variance of the liquidity trades, 
2
u.
To calibrate 2f , we use the COMPUSTAT database and collect yearly earning-per-share
(EPS) series for the stocks we previously sorted as large. We are able to retrieve 293 complete
time series for the period 1995 to 2005. For each stock j, we measure its year t EPS growth
as the rst dierence in yearly EPS, and compute the annualized standard deviation for each
time series of EPS growth. The cross sectional average standard deviation is 0:902, with 95%
condence bands equal to 0:802 and 1:011. We then set 2f = 1 in our theoretical model.
Next, we calibrate the variance of the liquidity trades, 2u, by matching the volume and price
impacts predicted by the model to their empirical counterparts for large rms. This step requires
solving numerically the model. Therefore, we need to specify how the information is disseminated
and how many traders are active in the market. As for the rst issue, we take the asset value, f ,
to equal the sum of all the signals available to the market,
f =
MX
i=1
si;0: (24)
Eq. (24) implies that the covariance between any signal and the asset value equals c0 = 0 +
(M   1)
0. Accordingly, the parameter  in the full information liquidation value [see Eq. (3)]
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equals the number of traders, M , which we set equal to 7, based on the empirical evidence in
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) and Chordia, Huh and Subrahmanyam (2008).2 Note, Eq.
(24) also implies that with 2f = 1, the correlation between any two signals available at two
distinct locations equals,
 =
1
M (M   1)

1
0
 M

: (25)
That is, the unconditional variance of each signal, 0, is known, once we specify .
We are now left with calibrating , the number of information linkages each trader has with
his peers, 2G, and, 2u. We solve the model on a grid of
 
2u; 

, for every G 2 f0; 1; 2g, and
compute a statistics summarizing the distance between the model predictions and their empirical
counterparts. The statistics is the sum of two mean squared errors (MSE) calculated over the
trading period: the MSE between the model implied volume and the cross sectional average
volume for large rms (in percentage); and the MSE between the model implied price impacts
and the cross sectional average price impacts for large rms (in percentage). We nd that 
2u; ;G

=
 
1:25  10 1; 0:15; 2 minimizes this statistics. The last two columns in Table 1
report the model predictions arising in this case. The model reproduces the salient features of
data: volume is U-shaped and increases toward the end of the trading period; instead, price
impacts decrease, overall.
In the next sections, we discuss the model predictions when the signals correlation is negative,
with  =  15%, and when it is both zero and positive, with  = 10%. These correlation values
are those that make our calibrated model fall within the empirically relevant range, although
as noted, the last two columns in Table 1 minimize the distance between the model and data.
Finally, to further our understanding of how information linkages impart on market variables, we
analyze the cases in which G = 0 (no information linkages), G = 1 (information linkages) and
G = 2 (many information linkages and \double overlap").
2To check the robustness of our results, we experimented all combinations of M 2 f7; 51; 101g and N 2
f10; 20; 40g, and obtained results qualitatively very similar to those we report below. The only exception regards
the behavior of n for large values of N , which becomes U-shaped for any G and M , as we explain in Section 3.3.
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3.2 Correlated trading and volume
Figure 4 depicts the correlation between the orders of each trader with his peers, close and distant,
corr (xi;n; xi+k;njFn 1) = n 1 (k;G) ;
where n (k;G) is the correlation between the average signals of any two traders i and i+ k (see
Proposition 2).
Figure 4 shows that for a given number of information linkages, n increases with the corre-
lation , for all the batch auctions n and the peers' distance k. This feature merely reects the
higher correlation between the signals available at each trader's location. Moreover, for given k
and G, the trade correlation decreases over time. This pattern is related to the market maker's
learning process. As in Foster and Viswanathan (1996), over time, the price conveys more and
more information about the average signal, rather than about the individual signals available to
traders. Similarly, in our model, the market maker learns more about the average of the average
signals, s [see Eq. (3)] than the private signals traders have about the asset value, si;0 [see Eq.
(1)]. This feature of the learning process implies that the market maker's resolution of the resid-
ual uncertainty, 2f;n in Eq. (18), takes place somewhat faster than the resolution of the traders'
residual uncertainty, &2f;n in Eq. (19). By Eq. (21), then, the tightness of beliefs, n, decreases
over time. At some point, n becomes so small that the market maker sets the price to a value
quite close to the traders' average opinion of the asset value (see Figure 5), in which case the
traders play a waiting game, as explained in Section 2.2. Inevitably, then, the traders expect to
be on opposite sides of the market, as Proposition 2 suggests.
Although each trader expects to trade against the market, our model predicts that the corre-
lation of trades varies across the market. In particular, information linkages induce each trader
to trade in the same direction as his close neighbors and in the opposite direction to his distant
peers. This property, which is formally due to Eq. (23) in Proposition 2, is well-visible from
Figure 4. This gure shows that the trade correlation, n, increases with G, especially during
the rst trading rounds. Indeed, the presence of information linkages leads to a higher duration
of the rat race, even when the correlation  is negative. This is illustrated by Figure 5, which
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depicts the dynamics of n for a large spectrum of values of  ( =  0:15, 0 and 0:90). As a
result, for close traders, n remains positive for the entire trading period, reecting the boost
in the correlation between the information endowments and the rat race. For distant traders,
however, information linkages are too weak to counterbalance the eects related to the market
maker's learning mechanism, by which each trader expects to trade against the market. In both
cases, the trade correlation decreases over time, a critical point we shall discuss below.
Finally, note that compared with the benchmark case of absence of information linkages
(G = 0), it takes fewer batch auctions for the trade correlation between distant traders to become
negative. Moreover, for distant traders, the trade correlation falls dramatically in the presence of
information linkages. For example, when  = 10%, the trade correlation among distant traders
at the end of the trading period is only  11%, in the absence of information linkages (G = 0),
while it reaches a value of  70% in the presence of information linkages (G = 1), and a value
of  30% in the presence of many information linkages (G = 2). Note, the trade correlation is
higher for G = 2 than for G = 1. This property arises because the presence of many information
linkages leads to the \double overlap" property described in Section 1.2 (see Figure 2). Such an
information overlap induces a quite substantial boost in the correlation between the information
endowments of all traders, which then translates into an increased trade correlation, even for
distant traders. Still, the trade correlation for distant traders is signicantly lower with G = 2
than in the absence of information linkages.
As outlined in the Introduction, these cross sectional properties of trading behavior are con-
sistent with previous ndings in the empirical literature. For example, Feng and Seasholes (2004)
report that in the Chinese stock market, geographically close investors trade similarly and distant
investors submit negatively correlated orders. Bae, Yamada and Ito (2006) nd quite similar re-
sults in the Japanese stock market: trades initiated by foreign investors are negatively correlated
with trades initiated by local investors. Along similar lines, Dorn, Huberman and Sengmueller
(2008, p. 902) argue that correlated trading can be related to \the likelihood that the traders are
exposed to the same signals (which are interpreted similarly)." The model predictions about cor-
related trading suggest additional testable patterns for correlated trading. In our model, trade
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correlation tends to decrease as the liquidation date approaches. This property holds for all
traders, close and distant. By way of contrast, consider the predictions about correlated trading
induced by herding behavior. Herding relies upon each trader \imitating" the peers' previous
trades, and would lead to a trade correlation increasing over time. Therefore, the model pre-
dictions about trade correlation help discriminate empirically between our information linkages
mechanism and herding behavior.
How does volume correlate among traders? Figure 6 depicts the correlation among the vol-
umes generated by the single traders (for brevity, the volume correlation), over the trading
period.3 The dynamics of volume correlation are related to, albeit distinct from, those of the
trade correlation. Absent any information linkages, individual trades are nearly uncorrelated
when the correlation  is negative or zero (see Figure 4), which translates into a similar property
for the volumes generated by the traders.
In the presence of information linkages, we explained that the correlation among individual
trades is positive for close neighbors, while it decays to negative values for distant traders (see
Figure 4). Moreover, this decay is more pronounced for G = 2 than for G = 1. For close
neighbors, the volume correlation features a pattern quite similar to that of the trade correlation.
However, as the distance between traders increases, the volume correlation decreases, overall, and
becomes U-shaped: few information linkages (G = 1) now lead to stronger volume correlation
than more information linkages (G = 2), except for the very rst trading rounds. This is because
for G = 1, the increased correlation of individual trades induced by the presence of information
linkages does not oset the correlation decay arising from the market maker's learning process.
Individual trades are strongly negatively correlated for most of the trading rounds and volume
correlation peaks up. When G = 2, the increase in the trade correlation resulting from the
information linkages dominates the decay induced from the market maker's learning process. As
a result, individual trades and volume are weakly correlated for most of the batch auctions.
3Informed volume is estimated as the conditional standard deviation of informed trades, as in Admati and
Peiderer (1988). We compute the correlation between the individual traders' volume through simulations, as we
do not have a closed-form solution for it.
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Existing empirical studies rarely tackle the issue of correlated volumes. The array of pre-
dictions produced by our model suggests a number of relations between correlated volume and
distance that warrant empirical scrutiny. To summarize, volume correlation decreases with the
traders' distance. Moreover, the correlation of volumes for close traders does not display the
same pattern as that for distant traders and, additionally, depends on the number of information
linkages in the market, as we explained. Finally, volume correlations are quite at over the trading
period, in the absence of information linkages. The last observation, alone, would be sucient to
test for the very presence of information linkages in a given market.
3.3 Volume, liquidity, eciency and traders' prots
How do information linkages aect total volume, liquidity, eciency and traders' prots? On the
one hand, a trader with many information linkages is able to estimate more precisely the asset
value, since he observes more signals on top of the one available at his location. On the other
hand, the same linkages lead a given trader to lose part of his monopolistic information power,
since other traders observe his signal. This second eect translates into an incentive for every
trader to anticipate his peers: trading aggressiveness increases and so does volume. This clearly
emerges from Figure 7, which plots the total volume, estimated as the conditional standard
deviation of the trades initiated by the M traders, the market maker, and the liquidity traders.
A direct consequence of such a trading behavior is that by impounding more information into
their orders, traders reduce the market maker's residual variance of the asset value, 2f;n, thus
boosting market eciency.4
The price responsiveness to the order ow, n, is displayed in Figure 8. When the correlation 
is positive, the combined eect of higher aggressiveness and better price discovery is the reduction
of the adverse selection faced by the market maker. As a result, the price impact of the order ow,
n, lowers, which makes the market more liquid, overall. When the correlation  is negative, the
previous conclusions are reversed: although market eciency still improves, liquidity deteriorates
4For space reasons, we do not report the pictures and additional discussion for the behavior of 2f;n, which can
be found in Colla and Mele (2008).
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in the presence of information linkages, especially during the rst batch auctions. This outcome
is the result of two forces. On the one hand, information linkages enhance the traders' estimates
of the asset value, as usual. On the other hand, when  < 0, the tightness of beliefs between the
traders and the market maker, n, is considerably low (see Figure 5), which leads the traders to
play a waiting game for the entire trading period (for G = 1) or for nearly all the batch auctions
(for G = 2). Thus, the market maker faces relatively more informed traders postponing their
trades for most of the time and, hence, he raises the price responsiveness. Naturally, these same
eects explain the dynamic behavior of total volume depicted in Figure 7.
Our analysis shows that information linkages among traders may lead to a variety of empir-
ically plausible patterns for total volume and liquidity occurring prior to a corporate event. As
we explained in Section 3.1, the pattern that best ts our sample is that with many information
linkages, G = 2, and a negative correlation among the signals available at each trader's location.
This combination results in increasing volume and decreasing price impacts over the trading pe-
riod, as in our data. At the same time, the model is able to generate additional predictions that
might possibly apply to alternative samples or sorting criteria, as we discussed. Moreover, our
model can explain the high frequency behavior of liquidity detected in the empirical literature.
For example, Krinsky and Lee (1996) show that with half-hour trading intervals, adverse selection
costs increase around the announcement date, a feature our sample displays as well, once we in-
clude data for the announcement dates (see Section 3.1). Results not reported here conrm that
our model, like others [e.g., Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and Back, Cao and Willard (2000)]
does indeed predict a U-shaped pattern for the price impacts, once we increase the frequency of
trading from daily to, say, hourly.
The last task of this section is to analyze the eects information linkages produce on the
expected prots from informed trading. Figure 9 illustrates two main results. First, information
linkages damage the expected prots when the correlation  is positive, but enhance them when
the correlation is negative. Second, for any xed G, expected prots are non-monotonic in the
correlation .
What are the origins of these ndings? Changes in the correlation  generate two eects.
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First, as  increases, the signals available at each location become informationally closer to one
other, thus reducing each trader's monopolistic power. Second, as Eq. (25) reveals, an increase
in  obviously implies a drop in 0, which makes the traders' estimates of the asset value more
precise. In the absence of information linkages, the losses in the monopolistic power dominate
over the precision gains, when  is high or negative. When, instead,  is positive and suciently
low, the losses in the monopolistic power are more than oset by the precision gains. Figure
9 reveals that these properties are preserved once we introduce information linkages, although
the threshold value of  below which information linkages enhance the expected prots becomes
simply zero.
In summary, the rst model prediction in this section is that information linkages boost both
market eciency and aggregate volume. As we explained in the Introduction, the extant empirical
literature is supportive of this prediction [e.g., Dorn, Huberman and Sengmueller (2008), Hong,
Lim and Stein (2000)], although there does not exist yet a systematic analysis of how such a piece
of empirical evidence is related to additional properties of our model. For example, we nd that
information linkages can aect liquidity in a quite rich manner: they damage it, when the signals
at the traders' location are negatively correlated, and they improve it, otherwise. Interestingly,
prots from informed trading are aected by the presence of information connections in the exact
opposite way: traders' expected prots may now increase or decrease, according to whether the
linkages convey negatively or positively correlated pieces of information.
To date, there are no empirical studies aiming at deciphering how aggregate volume, liquidity
and trading prots, all relate to the information connectedness among traders. Brennan and
Subrahmanyam (1995) nd a positive relation between liquidity and analyst coverage (a proxy for
information connectedness), and Hau (2001) provides some evidence that information connections
can lower traders' prots. As discussed, our model is consistent with these empirical ndings,
if the information linkages available to traders convey positively correlated information. At the
same time, the evidence in these papers obviously relates to dierent samples and does not tackle
all the diverse implications of our model. Our ndings in this section, in conjunction with those
for the cross sectional properties of informed trading and volume (discussed in Section 3.2), lead
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instead to a rich and well-dened battery of testable predictions, which can systematically be
dealt with in future empirical research.
4 Discussion of related work
The literature has produced prominent instances of rational explanations for heterogenous trading
behavior. Brennan and Cao (1997) develop a rational expectations model (not one with strategic
agents) in which a domestic asset is also traded by foreign investors. In their model, local
investors are able to estimate the asset value with higher precision, compared to foreign investors.
Thus, a good piece of public news makes those traders with more precise information (local)
trade less aggressively than those with less precise information (foreign), which might lead to
negative correlation between trades initiated by distant investors. Our paper oers an alternative
mechanism, in which heterogenous trade correlations occur even if the precision of the private
signals is the same for all the traders.
DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2004) consider a model in which agents belong to dierent
communities, compete for local resources, and face capital market imperfections. These imper-
fections lead to restricted stock market participation, which makes the marginal investors' utility
decreasing in the community wealth, provided risk-aversion is suciently high. Then, correlated
portfolio choices within a community arise because the marginal investors price assets taking into
account their \community factors." Our explanation of correlated behavior is also based on the
broad idea that investors belong to dierent communities (geographic, demographic, etc.). At
the same time, our model is built upon the informational distance between traders, and does not
rely on a consumption-based rationale.
Our paper also relates to the literature on social learning and information networks. (See
Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2008) for surveys of the literature on the broader area of the economics
of networks.) Early papers in this literature are those of Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995), who
study learning environments in which agents base their decisions on their peers past experience.
A more recent paper is that by DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003). The authors study the
process of opinion formation in social networks, and propose persuasion bias as a boundedly
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rational heuristic for processing information. As explained in Section 1.1, a new contribution
to the role of communication among strategic competitors is that of Stein (2007), who develops
a model in which competitors can nd it fruitful to engage in truthful conversations, provided
these conversations boost the quality of their initial estimates about an asset payo. While our
contribution shares similarities with all these papers in so far as we consider information networks,
our work explicitly analyzes the role played by these networks in the context of nancial markets.
In independent work, Ozsoylev (2006) develops a model in which every investor observes
the expectations of his neighbors. (See, also, Malinova and Smith (2006) for a related rational
expectation model.) His information network is similar in spirit to our local information linkages
mechanism. Indeed, our model can be interpreted as one in which every trader observes the
signals of the neighbors with some error, as we explained in Section 1.1. However, our work
diers from Ozsoylev's for two reasons. First, Ozsoylev considers a setup in which the investors
do not enjoy market power. The assumption of no-market power allows the author to investigate
asymmetric information networks. In our model, traders do enjoy monopolistic market power
and, hence, need to forecast the forecasts of others. To simplify this dimensionality issue, we
consider a symmetric network. The second dierence with Ozsoylev's model is that ours is
dynamic. Ozsoylev's work and ours therefore complement each other.
5 Conclusion
Why do individual investors exhibit a correlated trading behavior? One explanation put forward
in the empirical literature is that proximity aects portfolio choice, which makes informationally
close investors trade in the same direction, and informationally distant investors exhibit quite
distinct portfolio choices. Although this argument is simple and appealing, it is not clear whether
it can be made consistent with rational behavior. For example, it may be argued, the mere
observation of the equilibrium price and additional public signals might induce investors to all
trade in the same direction. Nor are the implications of an heterogeneous trading behavior clear,
both empirically and theoretically. For example, what are the implications of correlating trading
on market eciency, liquidity, volume, or protability from informed trading? Under which
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conditions do correlated trading and volume arise in a market and, eventually, disappear from
it? How dierently should we expect informationally distant investors to trade?
This paper contributes to providing answers to these questions. We consider a market in
which traders belong to overlapping information networks, connected through what we term
information linkages. We show that these linkages exert a quite substantial impact on trading
strategies as well as market variables. First, they aect the cross sectional properties of correlated
trading: our model predicts that \neighbor" trades are positively correlated and \distant" trades
are negatively correlated. While this prediction is consistent with the extant empirical literature,
the model also leads to one additional testable implication that calls for further empirical scrutiny:
the correlation among trades (close and distant) decreases over the trading period. This property
helps discriminate our rationale for correlated trading from others. For example, a theory based
on herding would imply an increasing correlation among close trades, due to each trader imitating
the previous moves made by his peers.
The second testable implication of the model relates to the cross section of volumes initiated
by informed traders. In the presence of linkages, the correlation of volumes depends on the
traders' location as well: it is always positive, and larger for close traders than for distant
traders. Moreover, over the trading period, this correlation is decreasing for close traders, and
non-monotonic for distant traders. Instead, we show that in the absence of information linkages,
the correlation among volumes is quite at over the trading period, and close to zero. This feature
is particularly useful in testing for the existence of information networks among traders.
The third set of implications of our model relates to aggregate variables. We show that in-
formation linkages raise volume and price informativeness, and signicantly aect liquidity con-
ditions and gains from informed trading. The model predicts that the traders' expected prots
increase (or decrease), and liquidity worsens (or improves), according to whether the information
linkages convey quite distinct (or positively correlated) signals about the fundamentals. These
properties are broadly consistent with previous empirical ndings, although their denite empir-
ical validation would need to be performed in conjunction with a systematic assessment of the
cross sectional properties our theoretical work suggests for informed trading and volume.
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Appendix
A. Preliminary results
Derivation of Eqs. (5)-(8). To derive Eq. (5), we use the denition of the average signal in Eq. (1). A
simple computation leaves:
var (si;0) =
G^0 + 2GG^
0
G^2
;
or equivalently (5). Next, we derive Eqs. (6) and (7). These equations correspond to two cases: (i)
2G  (M   1)/ 2, and (ii) 2G  (M   1)/ 2. We study these two cases separately. We introduce the
following piece of notation
~si;0 = fsi G;0;    ; si;0;    ; si+G;0g ;
to denote the set of signals each trader i has access to, as a result of the presence of information linkages.
Case (i) (2G  (M   1)/ 2). Consider traders i and j = i + k, k 6= 0. We have: si+k;0 =2 ~si;0 for all
jkj > G. Therefore

0(k;G) = cov (si;0; si+k;0) = G^
 2 GP
l= G
GP
m= G
cov (si+l;0; si+k+m;0) = 
0;
for all jkj > 2G; which is the second line in Eq. (6). If, instead, jkj  2G, si+k;0 2 ~si;0 for all jkj  G and
~si+k;0 \ ~si;0 6= f;g. In particular, trader i shares (2G + 1   k) signals with trader i + k. Each of these
signals contributes for (0 + 2G
0)/ (2G+ 1)
2 to 
0(k;G). Shared signals thus contribute for
0 + 2G
0
(2G+ 1)2
 (2G+ 1  k)
to 
0(k;G). The remaining (not shared) k signals contribute for
(2G+ 1)
0
(2G+ 1)
2  k
to 
0(k;G). Therefore,

0(k;G) =
(0 + 2G
0) (G^  k) + G^
0k
G^2
:
Grouping terms in the previous expression yields the rst line in Eq. (6).
Case (ii) (2G  (M   1)/ 2). This case diers from the previous one due to the double overlap
discussed in Section 1.2 (see Figure 2). In this case, the number of signals shared by traders i and i+ k is:
L(k;G) = 2G+ 1  k + n(k;G); k = 1;    ; M 12 : (A1)
The term n(k;G) arises because traders located on the trader i's right hand side semicircle might be
sharing signals with traders located between i+1 and i+ (M   1)/ 2 on the left hand side semicircle (see
Figure 2); and obviously the i-th trader shares signals with traders located between i   1 and i   G as
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well. The double overlap occurs if and only if trader i+ k on the left hand side semicircle and trader i  `
with ` 2 [1; M 12 ] on the right hand side semicircle are such that ` and k satisfy:8>>>><>>>>:
M   1
2
  (`  1) + M   1
2
  k  G
G  `  1
M   1
2
 k  1
The rst inequality in the previous restrictions requires trader i  ` to share his signal with trader i+ k.
The second and third constraints restrict trader i   ` to be on the right hand side semicircle and trader
i + k to be on the left hand side semicircle relative to trader i. Thus, for xed k (1  k  (M   1)/ 2),
the double overlap occurs if and only if
G  ` M  G  k; k = 1;    ; M 12 ;
and `  1. Clearly, mink (M  G  k) = M 12  G+1  1. Hence, the constraint that `  1 is redundant.
By the previous inequalities, it follows that:
n(k;G) = max fG  (M  G  k) + 1; 0g :
By replacing this result into Eq. (A1) leaves:
L(k;G) =
(
4G+ 1  (M   1); M 12  k  2
 
M 1
2  G

2G+ 1  k; 1  k  2  M 12  G
For all k 2 1; 2  M 12  G, 
0(k;G) is thus exactly as in case (i) for k 2 [1; 2G], and the rst line of
Eq. (7) follows. For all k 2 2  M 12  G ; M 12 , tedious but straightforward computations lead to the
second line of Eq. (7).
Finally, we demonstrate that Eq. (8) holds true. As usual, we consider the two cases in which 2G ?
(M   1)/ 2. If 0  2G  (M   1)/ 2, there are [M   (4G+ 1)] traders i+ k such that ~si+k;0 \~si;0 = f;g.
In correspondence of these indexes, cov (si+k;0; si;0) = 
0. Therefore,
 0 (G) = 2
2GP
k=1

0 (k;G) + [M   (4G+ 1)]
0:
The 2G covariances in the summation can be computed through the rst line in (6). Eq. (8) follows by
the expression of 0(G) in Eq. (5). Next, consider the case (M   1)/ 2  2G M   1. We have:
 0 (G) = 2

M 1 2GP
k=1

0 (k;G) +

2G  M   1
2

20(G)  M (0   
0)
G^2
  
0

:
By plugging Eqs. (7) and (5) into the previous equation, we nd that the expression of  0 (G) is the same
as the one obtained in the case 0  2G  (M   1)/ 2, and Eq. (8) follows. 
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Denitions and notation. We make the following denitions:
 The i-th trader residual informational advantage (relative to the market maker) on (i) the signal
available at his location, si;0, and (ii) his average signal, si;0, are dened to be:
si;n = si;0   tn; si;n = si;0   tn; (A2)
after n rounds of trading.
 The market maker's updates of the residual variances are:
n = var (si;0jFn) ; 
n = cov (si;0; sj;0jFn) (A3)
and
n (G) = var ( si;0jFn) ; 
n (k;G) = cov ( si;0; si+k;0jFn) ;  n (G) =
P
k 6=i 
n (k;G) ; (A4)
where n and 
n (resp. n (G) and 
n (k;G)) are the residual variance and covariance of the signals
available at each trader's location (resp. of the average signals available to each trader). Note that
by Eq. (5),
n (G) =
n + 2G
n
G^
: (A5)
We shall repeatedly use the results recorded in the following three lemmas, which are easy generaliza-
tions of results given in Foster and Viswanathan (1996).
Lemma 1. The relation between the market maker's updated estimate of the asset value, pn, and the
market maker's updated estimate of trader i average signal, tn, is given by
pn = tn: (A6)
Lemma 2. Let 2f;n and
 n (G) be as in Eqs. (18) and (A4). We have,
2f;n =
2
M
[n + (M   1)
n] : (A7)
Furthermore, the following recursions hold,

n 1   
n = n 1   n; (A8-a)
2f;n 1   2f;n = 2 (n 1   n) ; (A8-b)
n 1 (G)  n (G) = n 1   n, all G; (A8-c)

n 1 (k;G)  
n (k;G) = n 1   n, all k;G; (A8-d)
 n 1 (G)   n (G) = (M   1) (n 1   n) , all G: (A8-e)
Lemma 3. The market maker learning about individual and average signals evolves according to
tn = tn 1 + nyn; n =
cov (si;n 1; ynjFn 1)
var (ynjFn 1) : (A9)
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The relation between the updating parameters n and n is given by
n = n: (A10)
Finally, the trading strategy of any trader i does not depend on the residual order ow (yi;t   xi;t)n 1t=1 .
Precisely, we have:
xi;n = G^n

si;0  
Pn 1
r=1 ryr

: (A11)
Derivation of Eqs. (15)-(16). We have:
E
P
j 6=i sj;n 1
Fi;n = E Pj 6=i sj;n 1 si;n 1; Fn 1 =  n 1 (G)n 1 (G) si;n 1; (A12)
which is Eq. (16). Moreover:
E (f   pn 1jFi;n) = E [E (f   pn 1j s0)jFi;n]
= E (s  pn 1jFi;n)
=

M
E

si;n 1 +
P
j 6=i sj;n 1
Fi;n
=

M

1 +
 n 1 (G)
n 1 (G)

si;n 1;
where the rst line follows by the Law of Iterated Expectations, the second by Eq. (3), the third by Eq.
(A6) in Lemma 1 and the fact that s  pn 1 = M
PM
i=1 si;n 1, and the fourth by Eq. (A12).
B. Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
We characterize each trader's behavior o the equilibrium path. We conjecture that:
 The i-th trader deviation, x0i;n say, coincides with the equilibrium strategy in Eq. (13), plus an
additional term reecting the price deviation induced by suboptimal play in the previous n   1
rounds,
x0i;n = G^nsi;n 1 + n
 
pn 1   p0n 1

; (B1)
where p0n 1 is the price process that would emerge should the i-th trader have decided to deviate in
the previous rounds of trading.
 The price induced by past suboptimal play of the i-th trader shows up in the value function in Eq.
(9),
Wi;n = ns
2
i;n +  nsi;n (pn   p0n) + n (pn   p0n)2 + n: (B2)
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B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We claim that the conditions reported below guarantee mutual consistency between Eqs. (B1) and (B2):
Claim 1. The necessary and sucient conditions for a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which trading
strategies and prices are as in Eqs. (13)-(14) are as follows:
(i) The trading strategy coecients n and n:
n =
n
2
u
G^M2f;n
; (B3-a)
n =
(1  2nn)
h
1   1G^ (M   1)nn
i
2n (1  nn)
: (B3-b)
(ii) The price impact n is the unique real, positive solution to:
0 =
(M   G^) (n   
n)4u
G^M24f;n
4n +
2u nn (G)
2f;n
3n  
2u[2n + (M   1)
n   2GG^ (n   
n)]
M2f;n
2n
   nn (G)n +
2f;n

(B4)
(iii) The value function coecients satisfy the recursions:
n 1 = n
h
1   1G^ (1 + (M   1)n)nn
i2
+ G^2n [n   nn (1 + (M   1)n)]
 n 1 =  n
h
1  nn    1G^ (M   1)nn
i h
1   1G^ (1 + (M   1)n)nn
i
+ G^
n
n [n   nn (1 + (M   1)n)]  nnn + n
h
1   1G^ (M   1)nn
io
(B5)
n 1 = n
h
1  nn    1G^ (M   1)nn
i2
+ n
h
1  nn    1G^ (M   1)nn
i
n 1 = n +  2n2n
2
u + 
 2G^2n2n
2
nvar
P
j 6=i sj;n 1
Fi;n
where N =  N = N = N = 0 and
n =
 n 1 (G)
(M   1) n 1 (G) ; (B6-a)
n =

 
 n 1 (G) + n 1 (G)

G^M n 1 (G)
; (B6-b)
var
P
j 6=i sj;n 1
Fi;n =M [n 1 + (M   1)
n 1]  h1 + 2n (M   1)2i n 1 (G)  2 n 1 (G) :
(B7)
(iv) The full information residual variance satises the recursion:
2f;n =

1   1G^Mnn

2f;n 1:
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(v) Finally, the following inequality must hold:
n (1  nn) > 0: (B8)
Note that Proposition 1 is proven, once we demonstrate that Claim 1 holds true. To prove Claim 1,
we proceed in three steps. In the rst step, we derive a recursive expression for the price deviation induced
by traders' suboptimal play. In the second step, we derive the traders' optimality conditions. In the third
step, we compute the market maker updates.
We need the results in Lemmas 4 to 6 below.
Lemma 4. Let y0n and t
0
n be the aggregate order ow and the market maker's update of any trader's
average signal, when trader i deviates to (x0i;k)
n 1
k=1 during the rst n  1 auctions. The deviation in trader
j residual informational advantage, s0j;n = si;0   t0n, satises:
sj;n 1   s0j;n 1 =
1

 
p0n 1   pn 1

: (B9)
Proof. By Eq. (10), y0n =
P
j 6=i xj;n + x
0
i;n + un, and by Eq. (A9) in Lemma 3, t
0
n =
Pn
k=1 ky
0
n.
Therefore, by Eq. (A2),
sj;n 1   s0j;n 1 = (sj;0   tn 1) 
 
sj;0   t0n 1

=
n 1P
k=1
ky
0
k  
n 1P
k=1
kyk
=
1


n 1P
k=1
ky
0
k  
n 1P
k=1
kyk

=
1

 
p0n 1   pn 1

;
where the third line follows by Eq. (A10), and the fourth line holds as Eq. (14) implies that pn =Pn
k=1 kyk. 
Lemma 5. The conditional moments of the residual informational advantage satisfy:
E ( si;njFi;n) =
"
1  G^nn

(1 + (M   1)n)
#
si;n 1; (B10)
and
E
 
s2i;n
Fi;n = h1   1G^nn (1 + (M   1)n)i2 s2i;n 1
+  12n
2
u + 
 1G^22n
2
nvar
P
j 6=i sj;n 1
Fi;n ; (B11)
where var
P
j 6=i sj;n 1
Fi;n is given in Eq. (B7).
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Proof. By Eqs. (A2) and (A9),
si;n = si;0   tn = si;n 1   (tn   tn 1) = si;n 1   nyn:
Substituting for the equilibrium order ow, using Eqs. (13) and (A10), and taking expectations yields:
E ( si;njFi;n) = si;n 1   G^nn

h
si;n 1 + E
P
i 6=j si;n 1
Fi;ni :
Eq. (B10) follows by Eq. (16) and the denition of n in Eq. (B6-a). As for the proof of Eq. (B11), note
that by Eqs. (A2) and (A9),
E
 
s2i;n
Fi;n = s2i;n 1 + 2nE  y2nFi;n  2nsi;n 1E (ynjFi;n)
=
h
1   1G^nn (1 + (M   1)n)
i2
s2i;n 1 + 
 12n
2
u + 
 1G^22n
2
nvar
P
j 6=i sj;n 1
Fi;n ;
where the expression for var
P
j 6=i sj;n 1
Fi;n is given in Eq. (B7) and follows by simple computations.

Lemma 6. The price impact and the residual variance of the full information asset value are given by :
n =
MG^n
2
f;n 1
G^Mn
2
2f;n 1 + 
22u
: (B12-a)
2f;n =
22u
2
f;n 1
G^Mn
2
2f;n 1 + 
22u
: (B12-b)
Proof. We rst use Eq. (13) and rewrite the aggregate order ow in Eq. (10) as
yn =
PM
i=1 G^n (si;0   tn 1) + un: (B13)
Since
PM
i=1 si;0 =
PM
i=1 si;0 and tn 1 2 Fn 1, then
cov (si;n 1; ynjFn 1) = G^ncov

si;0;
PM
i=1 si;0jFn 1

=  2G^Mn
2
f;n 1; (B14)
where the last line follows from Eq. (A7) in Lemma 2. Moreover, by Eq. (A6) in Lemma 1 and the fact
that s  pn 1 = M
PM
i=1 si;n 1, the aggregate order ow in Eq. (B13) becomes
yn = 
 1G^Mn (s  pn 1) + un; (B15)
so that
var (ynjFn 1) =  2

G^Mn
2
var (s  pn 1jFn 1) + 2u =  2

G^Mn
2
2f;n 1 + 
2
u; (B16)
where the last line follows from Eq. (3) and the denition of 2f;n in Eq. (18). Since n = n by Eq.
(A10) in Lemma 3, then n in Eq. (B12-a) obtains from Eqs. (B14) and (B16).
39
By Eq. (3) and the Law of Iterated Expectations cov (f; ynjFM+1;n 1) = cov (s; ynjFn 1) ; and Eq.
(B15) yields
cov (f; ynjFn 1) =  1G^Mnvar (s  pn 1jFn 1) =  1G^Mn2f;n 1: (B17)
Equation (B17) together with the Projection Theorem gives
2f;n = 
2
f;n 1   ncov (f; ynjFn 1) = 2f;n 1

1   1G^Mnn

;
and Eq. (B12-b) follows replacing n from Eq. (B12-a) in the previous equality. 
We are now ready to prove Claim 1 in three steps.
Step 1: Price deviation. Using the equilibrium strategies in Eqs. (13)-(14), the price deviation writes
as:
pn   p0n = pn 1   p0n 1 + n
hP
j 6=i G^n
 
sj;n 1   s0j;n 1

+ G^nsi;n 1   x0i;n
i
:
Plugging Eq. (B9) in Lemma 4 into the previous equation, we obtain the following recursive equation for
the price deviation:
pn   p0n =
 
pn 1   p0n 1
 h
1   1G^ (M   1)nn
i
+ G^nnsi;n 1   nx0i;n: (B18)
Step 2: Traders' strategies. First, we show that the strategy in Eq. (B1) and the value function in Eq.
(B2) are mutually consistent. Any trader i faces the following recursive problem:
Wi;n 1 = maxx0i;n E
2664
0BB@f   p0n 1 + nx0i;n + nPj 6=i xj;n| {z }
=p0n
1CCAx0i;n +Wi;n
Fi;n
3775 : (B19)
Given the conjectured value function in Eq. (B2), the trading strategies in Eq. (13) and Eq. (B18), the
optimality conditions of the previous problem lead to:
0 = E (f   pn 1jFi;n) +
 
pn 1   p0n 1
  G^nnPj 6=i  s0j;n 1   sj;n 1
  G^nnE
P
j 6=i sj;n 1
Fi;n  2nx0i;n   n nE ( si;njFi;n)  2nnE (pn   p0njFi;n) :
together with the second order condition in (B8). By replacing Eq. (B9) in Lemma 4, Eq. (B10) in
Lemma 5 and Eq. (B18) in the previous equation, and by rearranging terms, we obtain Eq. (B1), where
n is as in Eq. (B3-b) and
n =
n   G^ 1n n
n

1 +
 
1   1n n

(1 + (M   1)n)
 : (B20)
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Next, we use Eq. (B1), and nd that the expected prot in any single auction is:
E

(f   pn)x0i;n
Fi;n
= G^2n [n   nn (1 + (M   1)n)] s2i;n 1
+ n
h
1  n

n + 
 1G^ (M   1)n
i  
pn 1   p0n 1
2
+
n
n (n   2nn) + n
h
1  (M   1)n

nn + 
 1G^n
io
G^si;n 1
 
pn 1   p0n 1

: (B21)
By taking the conditional expectation of the value function in Eq. (B2) leaves:
E (Wi;njFi;n) = nE
 
s2i;n
Fi;n+  n (pn   p0n)E ( si;njFi;n) + n (pn   p0n)2 + n: (B22)
Next, use Eqs. (B10) and (B11) in Lemma 5 together with Eqs. (B7) and (B18) into Eq. (B22). Finally,
plug the resulting expression for Eqs. (B21) and (B22) into Eq. (B19) and identify terms to obtain the
recursions for the coecients n; n;  n and n in Eq. (B5). Finally, Eqs. (B6-a), (B6-b) and (B7) follow
by a direct computation and Lemma 3.
Step 3: Market maker updates. By combining Eqs. (B12-a) and (B12-b) in Lemma 6 we nd an
alternative expression for n,
n =
G^Mn

2f;n
2u
; (B23)
which is Eq. (B3-a). By solving Eq. (B12-b) in Lemma 6 for 2f;n 1 gives
2f;n 1 =  
22u
2
f;n
G^Mn
2
2f;n   22u
: (B24)
By combining Eqs. (B3-a), (B23) and (B24) together with n = n 1  n  cov (si;n 1; ynjFn 1), we nd
that n solves,
n 1   n =   
4
u
G^Mn
2
2f;n   22u
2n =  
2n
2
u
2
f;n
2

2n
2
u   2f;n
 ; (B25)
Also, Eqs. (A8-c) and (A8-e) in Lemma 2 imply that
 n 1 (G)
n 1 (G)
=
 n (G) + (M   1) (n 1   n)
n (G) + (n 1   n) : (B26)
By eliminating n between Eqs. (B3-a) and (B20), we nd that
2u
2
n

1 +
 
1   1n n

(1 + (M   1)n)

=

G^n   n n

M2f;n;
and substituting Eqs. (B6-a) and (B6-b) in the previous equation leaves
2u
2
n

1 +
 
1   1n n

1 +
 n 1 (G)
n 1 (G)

=


M

1 +
 n 1 (G)
n 1 (G)

  n n

M2f;n:
The quartic equation F (n) = 0 in Eq. (B4) is obtained by substituting Eqs. (5) and (8) evaluated at n,
Eq. (A7) in Lemma 2 and Eqs. (B25) and (B26) into the previous equation, and by tedious computations.
The extended appendix in Colla and Mele (2008) contains the details to show that Eq. (B4) admits a
unique positive solution. 
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We need the following preliminary result.
Lemma 7. Let n be as in Eq. (17). Then,
n =
 
 n (G) + n (G)

M
n (G)
: (B27)
Proof. Dene,
 n (G) = (M   1)
n + 2G
G^
(n   
n) : (B28)
Then,
var ( sjFn) = var

M 1
PM
i=1 si;0
Fn
= M 2
h
M n (G) +M  cov
P
j 6=i sj;n; si;n
Fni
= M 2
 
M n (G) +M  n (G)

=
 
 n (G) + n (G)

M;
where the rst line follows by the denition of s. Then, Eq (B27) follows by the previous equality and the
denition of n in Eq. (17). 
We now proceed with the proof of Proposition 2. First, by Lemma 7 and Eq. (B6-b),
n 1 =
G^n

: (B29)
By plugging Eq. (15) into Eq. (13) leaves
xi;n =
n
n
[E (f jFi;n)  pn 1] = G^n
n 1
[E (f jFi;n)  pn 1] ; (B30)
where the last equality holds by Eq. (B29). This is Eq. (20).
Next, we prove Eq. (22). We have,
E
P
j 6=i xj;n
Fi;n = E Pj 6=i G^nsj;n 1Fi;n
= G^n (M   1)nsi;n 1
= G^n
 n 1 (G)
n 1 (G)
si;n 1
=
 n 1 (G)
n 1 (G)
xi;n;
= (Mn 1   1)xi;n
=
G^n
n 1
(Mn 1   1) [E (f jFi;n)  pn 1] ;
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where the rst line holds by the expression for the trading strategy in Eq. (13), the second line follows by
the expression for the forecast of the traders' informational advantage in Eq. (16), the third line follows
by Eq. (B6-a), the fourth line follows, again, by Eq. (13), the fth line follows by Eq. (B27) in Lemma 7,
and, nally, the sixth line holds by Eq. (B30).
To prove Eq. (21), note that by Eqs. (A5) and (B28),
n (G) +  n (G) =
n + 2G
n
G^
+ (M   1)
n + 2G
G^
(n   
n) = n + (M   1)
n:
Hence, we can rewrite Eq. (A7) in Lemma 2 as
2f;n =
2
M
 
n (G) +  n (G)

: (B31)
In terms of Eq. (B31), Eq. (B7) is,
var
P
j 6=i sj;njFi;n+1

=M
 
n (G) +  n (G)
  h1 + (M   1)2 2n+1i n (G)  2 n (G) :
Next, we substitute n+1 from Eq. (B6-a) in the previous equation, and obtain,
var
P
j 6=i sj;njFi;n+1

=M
 
n (G) +  n (G)
  n (G)2 +  n (G)2n (G)   2 n (G) : (B32)
We now compute &2f;n dened in Eq. (19),
&2f;n = var (sjFi;n+1) = var


1
M
PM
i=1 si;0
Fi;n+1 =  M
2
var
P
j 6=i sj;n
Fi;n+1 ;
where we use sj;n = sj;0   tn and the fact that tn 2 Fi;n+1 to get the last equality. Plugging Eq. (B32)
into the previous equation yields,
&2f;n =


M
2 "
M
 
n (G) +  n (G)
  n (G)2 +  n (G)2n (G)   2 n (G)
#
: (B33)
By Eqs. (B31) and (B33), we have
2f;n   &2f;n =


M
2  n (G) +  n (G)2
n (G)
:
Eq. (21) follows by the previous equality, the expression for 2f;n in Eq. (B31), and the expression for n
in Eq. (B27) in Lemma 7.
Finally, we prove Eq. (23). For k 6= 0, we have,
E (xi+k;njFi;n) = G^nE ( si+k;n 1jFi;n) = G^n

n 1 (k;G)
n 1 (G)
si;n 1 = n 1 (k;G)xi;n;
which is the rst line in Eq. (23). Moreover, we have,
Mn 1   1 =
 n 1 (G)
n 1 (G)
= n 1 (k;G) +
P
`=2fi;i+kg n 1 (`;G) ;
where the rst equality follows by Eq. (B27) in Lemma 7. The second line in Eq. (23) follows by the
previous equality, Eq. (22) and the rst line in Eq. (23). 
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Figure 1: Geographical location of traders 
This  figure depicts an example of a network of  information  linkages among M  traders who are physically 
located around a circle. Traders are ordered clockwise: trader i has trader i+1 as his clockwise neighbor and 
trader  i–1 as his  counterclockwise neighbor,  so  that  each  trader has  (M–1)/2  clockwise peers and  (M–1)/2 
counterclockwise peers. In this example, each trader has 2G=2  information  linkages: the signal available at 
the location of the i–th trader is also observed by one clockwise and one counterclockwise neighbor. 
i – 1i + 1 
i + (M – 1)/2 i – (M – 1)/2
i + 2 i – 2
i
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Figure 2: “Double overlap” 
This figure illustrates a “double overlap” in the signals available at the location of the traders. The “double 
overlap” arises when  the number of  information  linkages among  traders  is  large,  i.e.  2G≥(M–1)/2.  In  this 
figure, the i–th trader does not observe the signal available at the location of the (i+k1)–th trader, but only the 
signals available at the location of all traders up to (i+G) and (i–G) – e.g., the signal at the (i l− )—th trader’s 
location. Yet the (i+k1)–th trader observes the signal available at the location of the (i l− )—th trader, which 
makes the i–th and the (i+ k1)–th traders have correlated information endowments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i – 1i + 1
i + (M – 1)/2 i – (M – 1)/2
i + G i – G
i + k1 
l−i
i
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Figure 3: Volume and price impacts for large firms  
Cross sectional properties of volume and price impacts for 921 firms during the fiscal year 2006. Firms are sorted by the 
average dollar volume over the trading period leading to a corporate earnings announcement, and by a two‐way sorting 
procedure (along volume and price  impact dimensions) that  leaves the middle 50% range of the firms above the 80‐th 
percentile for average dollar volume. The left‐hand side panel displays the cross sectional averages (solid line) and 95% 
confidence bands (dashed lines) for volume up to, and excluding, the announcement date. The right‐hand side displays 
cross sectional averages (solid line) and 95% confidence bands (dashed lines) for the price impacts. 
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Figure 4: Heterogeneity in the correlation among trades  
Correlation among trades in a market with information linkages, seven informed traders, one unit of initial variance of 
information, one and ¼ units of  liquidity trader variance across all periods and ten trading rounds. The  left‐hand side 
panels depict the dynamics of correlation among trades arising when the initial correlation among the signals available 
at  the  traders’  information  linkages  is  negative  (ρ=–0.15).  The  remaining  panels  depict  the  dynamics  of  correlation 
among trades when this correlation is zero (middle panels) and positive (ρ=0.10) (right‐hand side panels). The top panels 
depict the correlation dynamics between two close neighbors, i.e. the dynamics of trade correlation between traders i and 
i–1. The bottom panels depict the correlation dynamics between two distant traders, i.e. the dynamics of the correlation 
among the trade emanating from traders  i and  i–3. Each panel displays the dynamics of correlation arising when each 
trader has a number of information linkages equal to 2G, with G=0,1 and 2. 
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Figure 5: Tightness of beliefs 
The dynamics of  nΔ ,  the  tightness of beliefs between  the market maker and any  trader,  in a market with 
information linkages, seven informed traders, one unit of initial variance of information, one and ¼ units of 
liquidity traders variance across all periods and ten trading rounds. The horizontal line is the inverse of the 
number of traders,  1−M . When  1−>Δ Mn , traders engage in a rat race. When  1−<Δ Mn , traders play a 
waiting game. The left‐hand side panel depicts the dynamics of  nΔ  when the initial correlation among the 
signals available at the traders’ information linkages is negative (ρ=–0.15). The remaining panels depict the 
dynamics  of  nΔ when  this  correlation  is  zero  (middle  panel)  and  positive, with  ρ=0.90  (right‐hand  side 
panel). Each panel displays  the dynamics  of  nΔ   arising when  each  trader  has  a  number  of  information 
linkages equal to 2G, with G=0,1 and 2. 
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Figure 6: Heterogeneity in the correlation among volumes  
Correlation among volumes initiated by informed traders in a market with information linkages, seven informed traders, 
one unit of initial variance of information, one and ¼ units of liquidity of liquidity trader variance across all periods and 
ten trading rounds. The left‐hand side panels depict the dynamics of correlation among volume arising when the initial 
correlation among the signals available at the traders’ information linkages is negative (ρ=–0.15). The remaining panels 
depict  the dynamics of correlation among volume when  this correlation  is zero  (middle panels) and positive  (ρ=0.10) 
(right‐hand side panels). The top panels depict the correlation dynamics between two close neighbors, i.e. the dynamics 
of volume correlation between traders i and i–1. The bottom panels depict the dynamics of volume correlation between 
two  distant  traders,  i.e.  the  dynamics  of  correlation  among  the  volume  generated  by  traders  i  and  i–3.  Each  panel 
displays the dynamics of the volume correlation arising when each trader has a number of information linkages equal to 
2G, with G=0,1 and 2. 
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Figure 7: Total volume 
The dynamics of  total volume  in a market with  information  linkages, seven  informed  traders, one unit of 
initial  variance  of  information,  one  and ¼  units  of  liquidity  traders  variance  across  all  periods  and  ten 
trading rounds. The left‐hand side panel depicts the dynamics of volume when the initial correlation among 
the signals available at the traders’ information linkages is negative (ρ=–0.15). The remaining panels depict 
the dynamics of volume when this correlation is zero (middle panel) and positive (ρ=0.10) (right‐hand side 
panel). Each panel displays the dynamics of volume arising when each trader has a number of information 
linkages equal to 2G, with G=0,1 and 2. 
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Figure 8: Price impacts 
Price‐impacts in a market with information linkages, seven informed traders, one unit of initial variance of 
information, one and ¼ units of liquidity trader variance across all periods and ten trading rounds. The left‐
hand  side panel depicts  the dynamics of  the price  impacts arising when  the  initial correlation among  the 
signals available at the traders’ information linkages is negative (ρ=–0.15). The remaining panels depict the 
dynamics of price impacts when this correlation is zero (middle panel) and positive (ρ=0.10) (right‐hand side 
panel).  Each  panel  displays  the  dynamics  of  price‐impacts  arising  when  each  trader  has  a  number  of 
information linkages equal to 2G, with G=0,1 and 2. 
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Figure 9: Tradersʹ expected profits 
The  traders’  expected  profits  in  a  market  with  seven  informed  traders,  one  unit  of  initial  variance  of 
information,  one  and  ¼  units  of  liquidity  trader  variance  across  all  periods  and  ten  trading  rounds. 
Displayed are the expected profits arising when each trader has a number of information linkages equal to 
2G, with G=0,1 and 2; and  the  initial correlations among  individual signals equals ρ=–0.15, –0.10, 0.01, 0.1, 
0.2,…,0.9, and 0.99. 
